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ABSTRACT 
This study examines variation in saving behavior of poor families enrolled in a children 
savings accounts program for orphaned and vulnerable school-going children in Uganda. 
We employ multilevel analyses using longitudinal data from a cluster-randomized 
experimental design. Our analyses locate the following significant results: (1) financial 
institutions’ characteristics affect average monthly savings and deposit frequency; (2) reported 
high levels of family cohesion are associated with higher deposit frequency; (3) children in the 
care of female guardians report higher average monthly saving and deposit frequency. 
The study has the following key implications: institutions and family relations matter in 
children savings mobilization. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Poor communities are less attractive to mainstream financial institutions. As a result, 
people residing in these communities are less connected to formal financial institutions. Lack of 
access to formal financial institutions makes poor communities and the people who reside in 
them to be, in large part, financially excluded from key financial services including access to 
safe savings products. Yet, just like their non-poor counterparts, poor people, and those who 
reside in poor communities, too have financial emergencies and unforeseen needs that may 
necessitate them, over time, to tap into accumulated savings. In addition, on an on-going basis 
poor people need lump sum amounts of money to cover family-related needs including the 
human basic needs of food, health, shelter (housing), education, and any unforeseen 
emergencies. Savings do not merely help individuals meet their future consumption needs—they 
strengthen one’s ability and capacity to mitigate risks and break the cycle of intergenerational 
poverty. 
Of recent, given the documented psychosocial and developmental impacts of saving and 
asset accumulation (McKernan, Ratcliffe, & Nam, 2010; Moore et al., 2001; Schreiner & 
Sherraden, 2007; Ssewamala, Han, & Neilands, 2009; Ssewamala, Neilands, Waldfogel, & 
Ismayilova, 2011; Ssewamala, Sperber, Zimmerman, & Karimli, 2010), there are several 
programs being implemented to connect poor people to financial institutions that would help 
them save and accumulate assets. Indeed, examples of these initiatives exist both in the 
developed countries (Sherraden, 2002; Sherraden et al., 2005; Sherraden, Schreiner, & Beverly, 
2003) and in the developing countries (Chowa, Despard, & Osei-Akoto, 2012; L. Johnson, Lee, 
Osei-Akoto, Njenga, & Sharma, 2012; Kagotho & Ssewamala, 2012; Ssewamala, Karimli, 
Chang-Keun, & Ismayilova, 2010; Ssewamala, Wang, Karimli, & Nabunya, 2011). 
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Studies on these initiatives provide documented evidence that poor people save—if 
provided with institutional structures, including incentives in the form of matched savings 
(Grinstein-Weiss, Wagner, & Ssewamala, 2006; Han, Grinstein-Weiss, & Sherraden, 2009; 
Ssewamala & Sherraden, 2004), financial education and knowledge (Ssewamala, 2012), and 
easy access to a financial institution (Grinstein-Weiss et al., 2006; Ssewamala, 2003; Ssewamala 
& Sherraden, 2004). Moreover, although there are several studies that specifically examine the 
impact of Child Development Accounts in poor communities of Sub-Saharan Africa (Ssewamala 
& Ismayilova, 2009; Ssewamala, Ismayilova, et al., 2010; Ssewamala, Neilands, et al., 2011), 
there are no studies (by this writing) of contractural savings in Sub-Saharan Africa that examine 
variation in saving behavior of poor African children. Indeed, very little is known about why of 
poor children in Sub-Saharan Africa, when faciliated with similar institutional structures, some 
save in larger ammounts and deposit more frequently and others simply do not behave the same 
way. The question therefore is: can the existing theories of saving behavior—tested mainly in the 
context of western socieities—explain variation in saving behavior of poor children living in 
poor communities in Sub-Saharan Africa?  
One of the initiatives that connect poor families to financial institutions are the child 
development accounts being implemented in Uganda under an experimental intervention study 
called “Suubi-Maka” (which means “Hope for Families” in Luganda). The Suubi-Maka initiative 
(described in detail below) is the focus of the current paper.  Specifically, using data from the 
Suubi-Maka initiative, this paper addresses two questions: (1) If poor children and their families 
in a poor community are given the opportunity of being connected to a financial institution, who 
among them saves and who does not?  (2) How do the children and their families that save (the 
savers) differ from those who do not save (the non-savers)?  
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The answers to these two questions are important because they would inform policy and 
programming, especially as governments and organizations in Sub-Saharan are increasing 
moving towards financial inclusion for young people—the fastest growing population segment in 
the region. Further, findings may also contribute to an understanding of what affects savings of 
poor families in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa, and may inform development of poverty 
reduction policies specifically targeted to vulnerable children in poor resource settings. 
 
2. BACKGROUND 
2.1.Factors accounting for savings behavior: theory 
There are several theories that explain individual saving behaviors. For example, 
neoclassical economic theories—including the life-cycle theory and the permanent income 
theory of savings—posit that resources allocated to individuals’ consumptions depend on their 
life resources and savings serve the purpose of maximizing individual’s consumption utility 
(Ando & Modigliani, 1963; Feldstein, 1976; Sherraden et al., 2003). Individuals save to smooth 
their consumption when facing income fluctuations. Savings increase when individual’s current 
income rises above the expected lifetime resources and decrease when individual’s current 
income falls below the expected lifetime resources (Modigliani, 1986). According to the life-
cycle theory, variation in savings among households is an inverted U-shaped function of age: 
young and elderly individuals having fewer saving than middle-age individuals. On the other 
hand, the permanent income theory posits that savings increase when an individual has an 
increase in temporary income. Increase in permanent income, however, decreases the savings 
(Beverly & Sherraden, 1999). 
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Unlike neoclassical economic theories, behavioral-related theories on saving do not 
assume that individuals are rational decision makers. Instead, they posit that individuals have 
“myopic” sides, placing too much weight on current consumption relative to future consumption. 
This leads to irrational choices - despite individual’s initial desire to optimize utility. According 
to this perspective, an individual’s saving behavior is improved by imposing the self-constraint 
on spending (Maital & Maital, 1994). 
Psychological and sociological theorists point to personality characteristics, motives, 
expectations, as well as family influence as main determinants of saving and asset accumulation 
(Beverly et al., 2008). Historical inequalities resulting in wealth stratification are also considered 
important determinants of asset accumulation (Spilerman, 2000), suggesting that poor saving 
behaviors and low asset accumulation among poor populations may be attributed to institutional 
discriminations. 
Within the sociological explanations of saving behavior is the argument of poor people’s 
restricted access to formal institutions of social assistance. Specifically, the argument is that poor 
rely heavily on support from the community and extended family. The heavy reliance on 
community, however, comes with a price: e.g. claims from extended family members, relatives 
and neighbors on cash available at home (Banerjee & Duflo, 2007). Indeed, in line with the 
sociological theories of saving, demands from extended family members for material assistance 
can undermine individual’s saving and asset accumulation efforts. Other arguments put across by 
sociological theorists point to demographic variables such as age, gender and household 
characteristics (e.g. number of people in the household) as key determinants for household 
saving behavior and asset accumulation (Browning & Lusardi, 1996). For example, presence of 
young children, particularly in single parent households, may have negative effect on 
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household’s saving behavior (Fry, Mihajilo, Russell, & Brooks, 2008), while a family structure 
of two working adults with no children may have a positive effect on household’s saving 
behavior. 
This paper focuses on savings among school-going orphaned children—average age of 
13—taken care by a living parent (children who have lost one parent) or by an adult caregiver 
within extended family (children who have lost both parents). Children’s saving-related beliefs, 
consumption patterns and expectations for saving can be heavily influenced by parents and 
caregivers (Gudmunson & Danes, 2011). Children learn financial management behavior through 
purposive instruction from their parents and caregivers (Jorgensen & Savla, 2010). Children also 
learn financial behaviors by observing and modeling those of their parents and caregivers (Shim, 
Barber, Card, Xiao, & Serido, 2010). Parents with higher socioeconomic status serve as role 
models for children. Indeed, findings from studies of Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) 
seem to support these propositions (Grinstein-Weiss et al., 2012; Schreiner, Clancy, & 
Sherraden, 2002).  Specifically, participants who recall their parents saving while they were 
young have more financial assets, compared to participants with no recollection of their parents 
ever saving as they were growing up (Han et al., 2009; Williams Shanks, Kim, Loke, & Destin, 
2010).  
The child savings accounts examined in this paper present a special form of savings 
accounts and rest in the realm of institutional theory of savings which posits that variation in 
savings behavior is explained by differentiated access to institutional structures, such as (i) 
access (proximity of savings programs—including access to electronic and direct deposits), (ii) 
incentives (matching deposits, earnings on savings including interests earned), (iii) information 
(educational programs to increase financial literacy), (iv) facilitation (assistance from program 
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staff, nudging saving behavior), (v) expectations (participants’ clear saving goals), (vi) 
restrictions (limiting the use of savings for specific designated/only authorized purposes), and 
(vii) security of investments (Beverly et al., 2008; Schreiner & Sherraden, 2007). The other 
element may be (viii) trust in the financial systems—which may be attributed to financial 
literacy, and an overall feeling of security.  
 
2.2.Child Development Accounts 
Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) are contractual subsidized bank accounts with 
a match on the deposits of account holders. The accounts have both an element of incentivizing 
and nudging the poor to save, and also addressing the challenge of the poor people’s restricted 
access to financial institutions. Programs that promote IDAs are grounded in two mutually 
reinforcing theories on saving behavior: asset theory (Sherraden, 1990, 1991); and institutional 
theory (Sherraden, 2005).  Specifically, in line with the asset-theory on saving, IDAs premise 
that the ownership of financial assets—including monetary savings, homeownership, education 
and income generating activities–changes people’s capacities, behavior and attitudes. With 
ownership of assets, individuals are likely to have better ability to make choices to pursue the 
kind of life they value (Robeyns, 2005; Sen, 1999; Sherraden, 1991; Ssewamala, Sperber, et al., 
2010). In line with the institutional theory of saving, and similar to 401K retirement plans, IDAs 
provide opportunities for subsidized asset building by matching participants’ savings. Just like 
the 401K matched saving plans, the matched amounts in the IDAs are restricted to the approved 
specific asset-building purposes, such as home purchase, investment in education, 
microenterprise, or purchase of a car to commute to work. Participants of IDA programs are also 
provided with financial education and financial counseling and support (Han et al., 2009; Mills et 
al., 2008; Schreiner & Sherraden, 2007). 
Page 8 of 36 
 
This paper focuses on a special form of IDA—which is intended for children and young 
adolescents—called Child Development Accounts (CDAs).  With CDAs a bank account is 
opened in a child’s name. This may be as early as at birth (Bennett, Quezada, Lawton, & Perun, 
2008; Nam, Kim, Clancy, Zager, & Sherraden, 2012; Prabhakar, 2010; Zager, Kim, Nam, 
Clancy, & Sherraden, 2010) or when children are already enrolled in primary school (Ssewamala 
& Curley, 2006; Ssewamala et al., 2009; Ssewamala, Han, Neilands, Ismayilova, & Sperber, 
2010; Ssewamala, Neilands, et al., 2011). The argument behind CDAs is that if savings are good 
for old people, they are even more essential for the young ones. Starting asset accumulation at an 
early age—specifically having savings accounts—may have a long-term impact on children’s 
savings behaviour, and, consequently, their economic well-being, as adults (Peng, Bartholomae, 
Fox, & Cravener, 2007). Additionally, CDAs contribute to overall child development and to 
children’s psychosocial behavior (Ssewamala et al., 2009) 
In developing countries, Child Development Accounts offering matching incentives are a 
new initiative. Such accounts are currently set up in South Africa (Fundisa accounts), Uganda 
(SEED, the Suubi/Bridges-related accounts in Centenary Bank, Diamond Trust Bank and 
Kakuuto Microfinance) and Sri-Lanka (SingithiKirikatiyo accounts). 
As detailed in the theory section above, saving participation and saving amounts—
including contractual savings like IDAs and CDAs—can be attributed to a variety of factors. 
However, most of the studies on contractual savings, on which these theoretical frameworks 
have been tested (and the resulting outcomes) are within the context of developed countries (Han 
& Sherraden, 2009; McKernan et al., 2010; Mills et al., 2008; Schreiner & Sherraden, 2007; 
Sherraden, Johnson, Elliott III, Porterfield, & Rainford, 2007; Ssewamala & Sherraden, 2004; 
Zhan & Sherraden, 2011). If contractual savings are good for welfare states like the United 
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States, they are even more essential for poor countries with no public welfare system—where 
having some money saved (however modest the savings may be) may make the difference 
between starvation and being able to feed one’s family.  Indeed, although, studies exist on the 
impact of contractual savings, including Child Development Accounts in poor communities, 
specifically those in Sub-Saharan Africa (Ssewamala et al., 2009; Ssewamala & Ismayilova, 
2009; Ssewamala, Ismayilova, et al., 2010; Ssewamala, Neilands, et al., 2011), we know very 
little about the drivers of the saving behavior of participants—especially children—in contractual 
savings being implemented in poor countries. In other words, what factors account for variation 
in saving behavior among poor children participating in these programs? Can we use the existing 
western focused theory to explain the observable variations? To address this gap, we use data 
from an NIH funded study on CDAs, called Suubi-Maka, implemented in Southwestern Uganda 
between 2008 and 2012. We specifically address the following question: What accounts for 
saving variations among poor participants in a contractual Child Development Accounts 
Program? Saving variation will be measured using three outcome variables: (1) whether, when 
invited and given an opportunity, participants opened a CDA; (2) For those participants who 
opened a CDA, what is their average monthly savings in CDA; and (3) For those who opened a 
CDA, what is their deposit frequency in CDA.  
 
3. METHODS 
3.1.Data 
The paper uses data from a 4-year (2008-2012) NIH-funded experimental study called 
“Suubi-Maka” (meaning ‘Hope for Families” in the local Ugandan language). The Suubi-Maka 
study utilized cluster-randomized control trial. Ten rural public primary schools in Rakai district 
Page 10 of 36 
 
of Uganda were randomly assigned to treatment group (n=5 schools) and control group (n=5 
groups). All the children included in the study had to meet the following inclusion criteria: (1) be 
an orphan—defined as a child who had lost one or both parents; (2) enrolled in a public primary 
school located within Rakai or Masaka district in Southern Uganda—two districts heavily 
affected by HIV/AIDS; (3) attending the last two years of primary school (an equivalent of 
grades 6th and 7th in the U.S. system); (4) live within a family setting. For a caregiver to be 
included in the study, he/she had to be identified as the primary caregiver for the participating 
child. Identification for the primary caregiver of a specific child was done by the child, and was 
verified by a letter from the local council/village leaders. The study did not enroll any children 
living in institutions –for example group homes or orphanages.  
The Suubi-Maka study collected data from both children and their guardians (N=346 
dyads) in three waves over a period of 24 months. Wave 1 – baseline data – was collected prior 
to random assignment. 
Each child in the treatment group (n=179) had a Child Development Account opened in 
his/her name. A deposit of up to 20,000 Uganda shillings (an equivalent of US$10 at the time) 
was subject to being matched on a monthly basis at a rate of 2:1. This means that if a child or 
family deposited an equivalent of $10 a month, they would receive $20 in their savings accounts, 
giving them a total of $30 in the account in one month. The withdrawals from the matched 
accounts were restricted to covering educational expenses and/or starting a family small business 
initiative—hence the name “contractual savings”. In other words, the participants and the Suubi-
Maka Project entered into a contract specifying the following: (1) savings, up-to an equivalent of 
USD10 per month in a Suubi-Maka account for the child, would be matched at a rate of 2:1; and 
(2) the matched amounts must be spent on one of the following goals: education financing, 
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and/or family small business development.  To illustrate, the participants’ personal savings were 
kept in a separate account from the actual matching amounts coming from the intervention. If a 
participant wanted to pay for education, the participant was expected to use one-third (1/3) of the 
required amount out of their Suubi-Maka personal savings accounts; and the Suubi-Maka project 
would then pay directly to the school the remaining two-thirds of the required amount out of the 
participant ‘s matching account. This process was intended to avoid misuse of the matching 
funds. In addition to the match, each participant with a CDA also received financial 
management/literacy training session. The CDA accounts were opened in three banks: Kakuuto 
Microfinance, Centenary Bank and DFCU. A participant was free to open an account in a bank 
of his/her choice.  Each of the three financial institutions required a minimum opening amount to 
set up a Child Development Account. The minimum opening amount varied across the three 
banks and was fully covered by the Suubi-Maka project—as a part of financial incentive to 
participants. The matching intervention period ran for a period of 20 months.  
Participants in the control group (n=167) received usual care for orphaned children that 
included the following: counseling, food, school uniforms, and scholastic materials. 
Given the focus of this paper—which is about understanding the saving behavior of 
participants in a contractual savings program, we use data only from the treatment group 
(n=179). The data (savings data) on account opening, deposits, and withdrawals—come directly 
from the financial institutions holding the children’s savings accounts; hence the data is pretty 
accurate. Data on predictor variables was collected through a 90-minute individual interview 
with children and guardians separately. 
 
3.2.Measures 
(a) Outcome variables 
Page 12 of 36 
 
To ascertain whether a participant is a saver or non-saver, we use the following measures: 
(1) Whether families opened up a bank account in the Suubi-Maka project or not. It is a 
dichotomous (Yes/No) variable. 
(2) Deposit frequency: calculated as a ratio of times of making deposits to the total number 
of months the account was opened. We use ratio, because the total number of months 
during which the CDA was opened differs across the project participants. 
(3) Average monthly savings per participants. This measure is obtained by subtracting total 
unmatched withdrawals from total deposits and dividing this amount by the number of 
months in which the participant made deposits. 
 
(b) Predictor variables 
Based on the multiple theoretical frames detailed above, we examine several factors to 
understand how savers differ from non-savers in Suubi-Maka project. More specifically, the 
following predictor variables are used in the analyses: 
Financial attitudes: child’s propensity to save and guardian’s propensity to save. Child’s 
propensity to save is measured by asking the question “If you had Uganda shillings 10,000, what 
would you do?” This measure ranges from 1 “spend all of it” to 6 “buy a cow, goat, pig, chicken, 
rabbit or other animal that would eventually bring in money”. The higher the score, the higher is 
the propensity to save. Guardian’s propensity to save is measured by asking the guardian an 
identical question to the one asked above (to the children): If you had Uganda shillings 10,000, 
what would you do?” 
Financial behaviors: child’s previous experience with saving (i.e., experience with saving 
prior to the treatment), and guardian’s previous experience with saving. Child’s previous 
experience with saving is measured through a baseline dichotomous question with a “Yes” or 
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“No” response: “Do you currently have any money saved anywhere”. Guardian’s previous 
experience with saving is measured through the following identical baseline question addressed 
to the guardians: “Do you currently have any money saved anywhere”. (Yes/No).  
Family cohesion reported by a child. To measure family cohesion, we use average score 
of 26 items. Sample items on the family cohesion scale reported by the child include: “Do your 
family members ask each other for help before asking non-family members for a help”, “Are you 
available when others in the family want to talk to you”, “If you have a problem, how often do 
your parents offer to help”, “Can you count on your current parent/guardian to help you out if 
you have some kind of problem?”. Each item is measured on a 5-point scale from 1 “Never” to 5 
“Always”. The average score ranges from 0 (low level of family cohesion) to 5 (high level of 
family cohesion). The measure has high level of internal consistency (Chronbach’s alpha = 0.8). 
Household assets: is a composite score consisting of 16 dichotomous items. Each item 
indicates household’s ownership of a specific asset, e.g. house, land, means of transportation 
(car, motorcycle, and bicycle), garden, and livestock. The score ranges from 0 (household has no 
assets) to 16 (household has all 16 types of assets). Questions used to compute household assets 
come from the guardians’ instrument. The measure has high internal consistency (Cronbach’s 
alpha = 0.7). 
Financial institution where CDA was opened: This measure has three response 
categories—representing the three financial institutions holding the CDAs: 1) Kakuuto 
Microfinance; 2) Centenary Bank and; 3) DFCU bank. 
Demographic characteristics: child’s gender and age, guardian’s gender and age, number 
of people in the household, child’s orphanhood status, type of guardian, and guardian’s 
employment status. Child’s orphanhood status is a categorical variable indicating whether the 
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child is double orphan (reporting both parents not alive), single paternal orphan (reporting father 
not alive), or single maternal orphan (reporting mother not alive). Type of guardian is a 
categorical variable with three response categories: “parents”, “grandparents”, and “other 
relatives”. Guardian’s employment status is a dichotomous variable indicating whether the 
guardian is employed or unemployed. 
 
3.3.Analyses 
This paper is about the saving behavior of participants enrolled in a Child Development 
Accounts program. For that reason, we focus exclusively on participants in the treatment arm of 
the Suubi-Maka study (n=5 schools; 179 participants). 
Data on predictor variables—a panel data on children and their guardians (179) dyads—
was collected in three waves, that is at baseline, at a 12-month follow-up, and at a 24-month 
follow-up. Except for three predictors—namely, child’s gender, guardian’s gender, and financial 
institution where CDA was opened—all other predictors are treated as changing over the course 
of three waves. Child’s gender and guardian’s gender are not changing over the course of three 
waves; and regression models include baseline (Wave 1) values for these predictors. Financial 
institution where CDA was opened also did not change over the course of study: each of the 
children in the treatment group was provided with one CDA account opened at one of the three 
participating institutions (Kakuuto Microfinance, Centenary Bank or DFCU bank); and these 
accounts could not be “switched” from one institution to another. Regression models include 
“Kakuuto Microfinance” as reference category. 
Data on outcome variables reflects savings by the end of the intervention: (1) whether—
by the end of the intervention—families opened up a bank account or not; (2) how frequently 
money was deposited on a bank account—by the end of the intervention—given the total number 
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of months the account has been opened; and (3) what was average monthly saving on a bank 
account—by the end of the intervention—given the total number of months the account has been 
opened. 
Data analyses are performed in Stata 12. To account for clustering of individuals within 
schools, we use survey commands in Stata 12 and report estimates of parameters along with 
confidence interval statistics. To answer the question guiding our study, we follow the following 
steps: 
1) Before running regressions of the outcomes on the predictors, first, we apply empirical 
Bayes prediction procedures on predictors. We fit multilevel models to predictor 
measures changing over the course of three waves—to obtain empirical Bayes 
predictions of random intercepts and random slopes. With this procedure, random 
intercepts show estimates of starting points for each individual and random slopes 
represent estimated change (over the course of 3 years) for each individual. Given the 
small number of schools (n=5), the multilevel models we fit to obtain empirical Bayes 
predictions have two levels, i.e., individual and time. 
2) After obtaining the empirical Bayes predictions on predictors, we fit regression models of 
three outcome measures onto estimates of random intercepts (model 1) and slopes (model 
2) separately. 
It is important to note that for two predictors—namely (i) child’s previous experience 
with saving (do you have any money saved anywhere? – reported by a child); and (iii) guardian’s 
previous experience with saving (do you have any money saved anywhere? – reported by a 
guardian)—only the baseline values are included in regression models, because our interest is in 
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experience with saving prior to the treatment. Furthermore, both measures are endogenous at 
Wave 2 and Wave 3, their values being affected by the treatment. 
3) Third regression model is run on mean scores of predictors for each person over the three 
waves. Results are compared with previous two models. 
 
4. RESULTS 
4.1.Description of measures 
Table 1 describes both predictor and outcome measures. Due to attrition, number of 
treatment group participants at Wave 3 reduced from 179 to166 (an attrition rate of 7.3%). This 
is considered a good attrition rate over a 3-year study period.  
At study initiation/baseline: on average, participants—with mean age of 13 for children 
and 44 for guardians—lived in households with 7 people. Girls represented 65% of the sample; 
23% of children in the sample were double orphans (both parents not alive), 58% were single 
paternal orphans (father not alive), and 19%—single maternal orphans (mother not alive). 
Families reported an average 6 items on the household assets measure—signifying relatively 
poor families (the range on this measure is 0 to 16 items). Further, both children and guardians 
report above average scores on propensity to save. Specifically, children scored an average of 4.8 
out of a possible score of 6; and guardians scored an average of 4 out of a possible score of 6. 
Further, children reported high scores on the family cohesion measure (average score=3.8 out of 
5). 
At baseline, 25.5% of children reported their guardians saving money for them. The 
percentages were 71.5% and 55.3% at Waves 2 and 3, respectively. 
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At baseline, 20.1% of children participants reported having money saved somewhere. 
There was a 29-percentage point increase to 49% at Wave 2, and a 43-percentage point increase 
to 63.3% by Wave 3.  Among guardians, at baseline, 39.7% of participants reported having 
money saved somewhere. At Wave 2, it was 56.9% and at Wave 3 – 67.9% of guardians reported 
having money saved somewhere. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
Out of 179 families enrolled in treatment group, 81.6% (n=146) had Child Development 
Accounts opened up as a result of participation in the study. Out of the 146 accounts opened, 
8.2% (95% CI=0.3, 72) were opened in Kakuuto Microfinance Institution; 35% (95% CI=4.2, 
87) were opened in Centenary Bank and 57% (95% CI=8.8, 95) were opened in DFCU bank. 
Financial institutions were unevenly distributed across the schools, which may explain 
significant variation in 95% confidence interval estimates. Out of 146 accounts opened, 11 
accounts were never activated and17 accounts had no deposit made during the project 
implementation period—beyond the opening amount provided by the project. In 118 CDA, each 
participant saved an average of UGX 5,477 per month (an equivalent of USD 3.04. Average 
exchange rate was 1USD for 1,800 UGX at the time of the study). The bottom 10% saved an 
average of UGX 171 while the top 10% saved an average of UGX 19,090. Average deposit 
frequency equaled to 0.29, that is, participants deposited 29% of time when the account was 
opened. 
 
4.2.Regression analyses 
For each outcome measure (i.e., whether families opened up a bank account in the Suubi-
Maka project or not; deposit frequency; and average monthly savings per participants) we fit 
three distinct regression models. Models 1 and 2 are regressions of outcome measures onto 
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random intercepts and random slopes of predictors. Model 3 is a regression of outcome measures 
onto mean scores of predictors over the three waves. 
(a) Whether Participants Opened CDA Account 
Table 2 presents results of binomial regressions on whether participants opened CDA 
accounts or not. It reports odds ratios and 95% confidence interval statistics. 
Model 1 (see Table 2) illustrates that the fraction of families opening a CDA is higher 
among children who reported higher baseline scores on propensity to save (odds ratio=1.8, 95% 
CI=1.3, 2.4). Furthermore, proportion of families that opened a CDA was greater among 
households where guardian reported having baseline experience with saving (odds ratio=2.2, 
95% CI=1.1, 4.2). 
Results also indicate (Model 3) that, on average over the course of project 
implementation period, fraction of participants opening a CDA was greater among single 
orphans compared to double orphans (odds ratio=0.99, 95% CI=0.99, 0.997).  
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
(b) Average Monthly Saving Per Participant 
In Table 3, we present results of linear regressions on average monthly saving per 
participants. We find significant results—confirmed by all three models—for having CDA 
opened in Centenary Bank: participants who opened up CDA in Centenary Bank had less 
average monthly savings, compared to participants who opened up CDA in Kakuuto 
Microfinance. Model 1 shows similar results for another financial institution, DFCU: participants 
who opened up CDA in DFCU had less average monthly savings, compared to participants who 
opened up CDA in Kakuuto Microfinance (B= -3,969, 95% CI=      -6,510; -1,429). 
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Model 1 also illustrates that single orphans had higher average monthly saving compared 
to double orphans (B= 48, 95% CI= 12; 84). Model 2 demonstrates that children taken care by 
female guardians had higher average monthly saving compared to children taken care by male 
guardians (B= 3,309, 95% CI=300; 6,318). 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
Additionally, Table 3 shows significant negative association between guardian’s 
propensity to save and average monthly savings. This might be due to specifics of measuring the 
participants’ propensity to save. Both children and guardians were asked a question “If you had 
Uganda shillings 10,000, what would you do?” and were given the following response options—
from the lowest to the highest score—“spend all of it”, “spend most of it”, “spend half, save 
half”, “save most of it”, “save all of it”, and “buy a cow, goat, pig or other animal that would 
eventually bring money”. It is, therefore, possible that score “6”—although indicating the highest 
propensity to save—is associated with lower monetary saving and higher investment into non-
monetary assets. 
(c) Deposit Frequency 
Table 4 describes results of regression analyses on deposit frequency in CDA. All three 
models show significant effect of guardian’s propensity to save and guardian’s gender on 
deposit frequency. 
At baseline (Model 1), higher guardian’s propensity to save is associated with lower 
deposit frequency (B= -0.22, 95% CI= -0.4; -0.05). Similarly, on average over the project 
implementation period (Model 3), higher guardian’s propensity to save is associated with lower 
deposit frequency (B= -0.05, 95% CI= -0.08; -0.02). As explained above, this might be due to 
specifics of measuring the participants’ propensity to save. Meanwhile, as would be expected, 
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increase in guardian’s propensity to save (Model 2) is associated with increased deposit 
frequency (B= 2.5, 95% CI= 0.5; 4.6). 
On average over the project implementation period (Model 3), higher family cohesion 
reported by child is associated with higher deposit frequency (B= 0.16, 95% CI= 0.03; 0.3). 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
In addition, all three models demonstrate that children taken care by female guardians 
deposit more frequently than children taken care by male guardians. 
Participants who had CDA opened in Centenary Bank (B= -0.08, 95% CI= -0.1; -0.02) 
and in DFCU (B= -0.15, 95% CI= -0.3; -0.04) deposited less frequently, compared to 
participants who had CDA opened in Kakuuto Microfinance (Model 1). 
 
5. DISCUSSION 
The results point to two main findings. First, in this study, we find that financial 
institution characteristics influence saving performance of children. In our analyses, participants 
saving in a community-based microfinance institution (Kakuuto Microfinance) saved more and 
deposited more frequently, compared to those saving in more urban-based financial institutions 
located further away from the community. We do not know whether these differences in saving 
performance are due to variation in operational procedures utilized by financial institutions (e.g., 
frequency of communicating with clients, physical proximity to clients, availability of staff in 
case if clients need support and advice, etc.). The strong association between financial 
institutions and saving behavior (in children’s accounts offered in these institutions) urges for 
further research to better understand what specific operational procedures and policies of 
financial institutions account for the variation in saving behavior of their clients. 
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Second, family does matter in regards to individual saving behavior. Higher family 
cohesion, as reported by child, is associated with higher frequency of depositing money into 
child’s savings account. Having even one biological parent (the case of single orphans)—as 
compared to having no biological parents survived (the case of double orphans)—increases the 
likelihood of a savings account being opened for a child as well as the amount of average 
monthly savings. In addition, guardian’s propensity to save is an important factor affecting the 
average monthly saving in children’s savings accounts as well as frequency of depositing money 
into these accounts. This finding is important in light of previously established strong association 
between caregiver’s financial behavior, specifically asset accumulation, and child’s wellbeing 
(Conley, 2001; Mayer, 1997; Williams Shanks et al., 2010). Additionally, the findings of this 
study augment earlier studies that point to the importance of matrilineal support (Karimli, 
Ssewamala, & Ismayilova, 2012; Oleke, Blystad, & Rekdal, 2005) in care and support of 
orphaned and vulnerable children. In this case, children under the care of female guardians saved 
more and deposited more frequently. Significant effect of specific caregiver characteristics (i.e. 
gender and propensity to save) provides further insight into the family-level decision making 
with regard to saving for children. 
Having savings accounts help children better understand concepts related to savings and 
investment (E. Johnson & Sherraden, 2007), and this may have a long-term impact on children’s 
savings behavior as adults (Peng et al., 2007), thus, break the circle of intergenerational poverty. 
Identifying factors that account for saving behavior—specifically among children and their 
families in poor communities in Sub-Saharan Africa—can help improving saving performance 
and, therefore, contribute to successful asset-building in the long-run. Furthermore, it may add to 
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the knowledge on feasibility of social welfare policies focused on asset-building (in this case 
savings)—rather than meeting immediate consumption needs—for the poor. 
 
6. LIMITATIONS 
One of the limitations of this study is that the dataset does not contain information on 
household consumption and expenditure patterns, and, therefore, we cannot look closely into 
households’ financial management mechanisms. In the Suubi-Maka dataset, when children are 
saving, we do not know who is making the decision to save: children themselves or families? It 
is important to understand who, within the family, made decisions on savings and how these 
decisions were communicated among the family members; how the structure of power within the 
household, social constructions of gender behavior and orphanhood status affect family’s 
decision to save for a child, especially for an orphan child taken care by a family. Also, it would 
be informative to examine how saving in children accounts affected families’ consumption 
patterns, particularly given significant budget constrains experienced by poor families in our 
sample. 
Secondly, Suubi-Maka study focuses specifically on school-going children who are taken 
care by a living parent (when the child is a single orphan) or by an adult caregiver within an 
extended family (when the child is a double orphan). The study does not cover orphans living in 
child-headed households or orphans living in streets. Therefore, in this paper, we refrain from 
drawing conclusions about saving behavior of all orphans. As illustrated by the study results, 
families have significant effect on individuals’ saving behaviors. It is also stated elsewhere 
(Gudmunson & Danes, 2011; Shim et al., 2010) that children’s saving behavior is influenced by 
their family members, specifically parents. Consequently, we refrain from concluding how 
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orphans would save in the absence of family structure (in case of street orphans) or in the 
absence of adult caregiver (in case of child-headed households) 
 
7. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The study has the following key implications: financial institutions and family relations 
matter in children savings mobilization. 
In line with institutional theory of saving and previous findings on importance of 
institutions in affecting savings outcomes (Curley, Ssewamala, & Sherraden, 2009; Han & 
Sherraden, 2009; Schreiner & Sherraden, 2007; Ssewamala & Sherraden, 2004), our findings 
show that financial institutions significantly affect savings in Child Development Accounts. 
Further research may be needed to understand what specific operational procedures within 
financial institutions affect saving behavior of their clients. This being said, however, our 
findings suggest that institutional structures of asset-building initiatives affect savings among 
poor children and their families in poor communities of Sub-Saharan Africa. Specific 
institutional features, therefore, shall be focus of policy initiatives encouraging asset building 
among poor communities in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
In agreement with previous studies (Danes, 1994; Gudmunson & Danes, 2011; Kim, 
LaTaillade, & Kim, 2011), families play an important role in children saving mobilization. This 
finding suggests that families—both biological and extended families—shall be seen as a vital 
component in building assets for poor children in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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Table 1. Description of measures 
 
PREDICTOR MEASURES 
Wave 1 
(n=179) 
Wave 2 
(n=171) 
Wave 3 
(n=166) 
Mean [95% Confidence Interval] 
Child's age (range: 10-17) 13 [13; 14] 14 [14; 15] 15 [15; 16] 
Guardian's age (range: 18-87) 44 [37; 51] 44 [38; 51] 45 [37; 53] 
Number of people in the household (range: 1-13) 7 [6; 7] 7 [6; 7] 6 [6; 7] 
Household assets (range: 0-16) 6 [4.6; 7.8] 6 [4.6; 7.8] 6 [5.3; 7.5] 
Family Cohesion reported by child (range: 0-5) 3.8 [3.7; 3.9] 3.9 [3.8; 3.9] 3.9 [3.8; 4] 
Child's propensity to save (range: 1-6) 4.8 [4; 5.6] 4.7 [3.9; 5.5] 5 [4.8; 5.5] 
Guardian's propensity to save (range: 1-6) 4 [3.9; 4.6] 3.7 [3; 4] 4 [3.6; 4] 
Percent [95% Confidence Interval] 
Female child 65.4 [49.1; 78.6] 65.5 [48.7; 79.2] 63.9 [46.6; 78.2] 
Child's orphanhood status   
Double orphan 23 [17.6; 29.5] 24.3 [18.5; 31.2] 21.5 [14.1; 31.3] 
Single paternal orphan 57.9 [48.7; 66.5] 57 .4 [50; 64.5] 59 [48.2; 68.8] 
Single maternal orphan 19 [13; 27] 18 .3[13.4; 24.7] 19.6 [16.4; 23.3] 
Type of guardian   
Parents 40.2 [28; 53.8] 41.3 [31.4; 52] 43.2 [31.3; 55.9] 
Grandparents 21.2 [10; 40.6] 21.6 [9.9; 40.8] 20.4 [8.4; 41.6] 
Other 38.5 [28.9; 49.2] 37.1 [28.9; 46.2] 36.4 [29; 44.5] 
Female guardian 77.7 [59.9; 89] 78.4 [61.4; 89.3] 77.2 [61.7; 87.7] 
Guardian's employment status   
Unemployed 11 .2 [5; 22.8] 6.6 [2.6; 15.6] 5.6 [1.4; 19.6] 
Employed 88.8 [77.2; 94.9] 93.4 [84.4; 97.4] 94.4 [80.4; 98.6] 
Child's experience with saving. Do you have 
money saved (reported by child)? (%, YES) 20.1 [12.6; 30.5] 49 [34.5; 63.9] 63.3 [57.9; 68.4] 
Guardian's experience with saving. Do you have 
money saved (reported by guardian)? (%, YES) 39.7 [19.8; 63.7] 56.9 [44.5; 68.4] 67.9 [54.7; 78.8]  
Financial Institution where CDA was opened 
(%), n=146   
  Kakuuto Microfinance   
 
8.2 [0.3; 72] 
Centenary Bank   
 
35 [4.2; 87] 
DFCU     57 [8.8; 95] 
OUTCOME MEASURES Percent and Mean [95% Confidence Interval] 
Opened CDA (%, YES)   
 
81.6 [53.9; 94.4] 
Average monthly saving (range: 100-38,158), 
n=118   
 
5,477 [2,437; 
8,516] 
Deposit frequency, n=118    0.29 [0.18; 0.4] 
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Table 2: Whether Participants Opened CDA Accounts. 
VARIABLES 
Random 
intercept 
(Model 1) 
Random slope 
(Model 2) 
Mean 
predictor over 
three waves 
(Model 3) 
Odds Ratio [95% Confidence Interval] 
Household assets  1.1 242.8 1.1 
 
[0.8 - 1.7] [8.83e-05 - 6.673e+08] [0.9 - 1.4] 
Family Cohesion reported by child  1.4 0.02 0.7 
 
[0.1 - 28.2] [4.34e-07 - 921.3] [0.1 - 6.7] 
Child's propensity to save  1.8** 0.04*** 1.3 
 
[1.3 - 2.4] [0.02 - 0.08] [0.9 - 1.6] 
Guardian's propensity to save  0.5 67,830 0.9 
 
[0.08 - 3.3] [2.88e-06 - 1.595e+15] [0.6 - 1.5] 
Child's age  0.99 Omitted 1.1 
 
[0.9 - 1.2] 
 
[0.9 - 1.4] 
Guardian's age  1.01 1.1 1.003 
 
[0.9 - 1.1] [0.7 - 1.6] [0.95 - 1.06] 
Number of people in the household  1.1 2.1 1.01 
 
[0.8 - 1.5] [0.12 - 35.7] [0.7 - 1.5] 
Child's gender (female) 1.1 0.9 0.8 
 
[0.5 - 2.5] [0.4 - 2.4] [0.4 - 1.7] 
Child's orphanhood status 0.99 0.99 0.99** 
 
[0.95 - 1.02] [0.99 - 1] [0.99 - 0.997] 
Type of guardian 0.7 0.02 0.6 
 
[0.24 - 1.8] [1.39e-06 - 225.9] [0.3 - 1.4] 
Guardian's gender 0.94 1.11 1.4 
 
[0.22 - 3.97] [0.34 - 3.7] [0.5 - 3.7] 
Guardian's employment status 1.2 1.4 6.6 
 
[0.95 - 1.4] [0.9 - 2.4] [0.8 - 51.6] 
Child's experience with saving. Do you have 
money saved (reported by child)? (%, YES, 
baseline value) 
1.7 1.99 1.6 
 
[0.2 - 12.5] [0.3 - 11.6] [0.2 - 15.4] 
Guardian's experience with saving. Do you 
have money saved (reported by guardian)? (%, 
YES, baseline value) 
2.2* 2.2 2.6* 
 
[1.1 - 4.2] [0.8 - 5.8] [1.3 - 4.9] 
Constant 4.2 4.05* 0.15 
 
[0.9 - 19.7] [1.2 - 13.9] [6.89e-05 - 304.7] 
Observations 176 176 176 
*p≤0.05, **p≤0.01, ***p≤0.001 
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Table 3: Average Monthly Saving per Participant. 
VARIABLES 
Random 
intercept 
(Model 1) 
Random slope 
(Model 2) 
Mean predictor 
over three waves 
(Model 3) 
Beta-coefficient [95% Confidence Interval] 
Household assets  -76 -5,209 -10 
 
[-773 - 621] [-30,773 - 20,355] [-415 - 394] 
Family Cohesion reported by child  3,428 -3,870 3,054 
 
[-1,710 - 8,567] [-16,707 - 8,967] [-1,497 - 7,605] 
Child's propensity to save  455 3,426 120 
 
[-1,830 - 2,741] [-8,237 - 15,088] [-1,246 - 1,485] 
Guardian's propensity to save  -3,662* 44,958 -855* 
 
[-6,908 - -416] [-2,260 - 92,176] [-1,499 - -210] 
Child's age  -1,127* Omitted -902 
 
[-2,097 - -157] 
 
[-1,831 - 28] 
Guardian's age  -95 538 -84 
 
[-248 - 57] [-106 - 1,183] [-248 - 81] 
Number of people in the household  209 2,514 197 
 
[-194- 612] [-2,057 - 7,085] [-322 - 715] 
Child's gender 2,229 2,142 2,454 
 
[-1,254 - 5,712] [-47 - 4,331] [-1,184 - 6,092] 
Child's orphanhood status 48* 9 -17 
 
[12 - 84] [-7 - 25] [-39 - 6] 
Type of guardian 1 601 -201 
 
[-1,949 - 1,950] [-5,734 - 6,936] [-1,647 - 1,244] 
Guardian's gender 2,431 3,309* 2,590 
 
[-571 - 5,433] [300 - 6,318] [-350 - 5,531] 
Guardian's employment status 302 408 3,713 
 
[-87- 691] [-302 - 1,118] [-249 - 7,674] 
Child's experience with saving. Do you have 
money saved (reported by child)? (%, YES, 
baseline value) 
-907 -200 -487 
 
[-5,737 - 3,924] [-5,121 - 4,721] [-4,659 - 3,685] 
Guardian's experience with saving. Do you have 
money saved (reported by guardian)? (%, YES, 
baseline value) 
2,151 3,081 2,569 
 
[-2,162 - 6,464] [-723 - 6,885] [-2,315 - 7,454] 
Financial Institution where CDA was opened: 
Centenary Bank -4,197** -3,284** -3,488* 
 
[-6,327 - -2,068] [-4,879 - -1,689] [-5,609 - -1,367] 
Financial Institution where CDA was opened: 
DFCU -3,969* -3,126 -2,806 
 
[-6,510 - -1,429] [-7,512 - 1,260] [-5,896 - 284] 
Constant 5,118** 3,222 7,209 
 
[3,146 - 7,089] [-255 - 6,699] [-30,145 - 44,563] 
 
  
  
Observations 116 116 116 
R-squared 0.229 0.153 0.226 
*p≤0.05, **p≤0.01, ***p≤0.001 
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Table 4: Deposit Frequency. 
VARIABLES 
Random 
intercept 
(Model 1) 
Random slope 
(Model 2) 
Mean predictor 
over three waves 
(Model 3) 
Beta-coefficient [95% Confidence Interval] 
Household assets  -0.01 -0.4 -0.01 
 
[-0.03 - 0.01] [-1.4 - 0.6] [-0.01 - 0.004] 
Family Cohesion reported by child  0.18 -0.4 0.16* 
 
[-0.03 - 0.4] [-1.13 - 0.3] [0.03 - 0.3] 
Child's propensity to save  0.05 -0.06 0.03 
 
[-0.06 - 0.2] [-0.6 - 0.5] [-0.03 - 0.09] 
Guardian's propensity to save  -0.22* 2.5* -0.05* 
 
[-0.4 - -0.05] [0.5 - 4.6] [-0.08 - -0.02] 
Child's age  -0.04* Omitted -0.03 
 
[-0.1 - -0.01] 
 
[-0.1 - 0.002] 
Guardian's age  -0.003 0.02 -0.002 
 
[-0.01 - 0.001] [-0.03 - 0.1] [-0.01 - 0.003] 
Number of people in the household  0.01** 0.05 0.01 
 
[0.01 - 0.02] [-0.2 - 0.3] [-0.003 - 0.02] 
Child's gender 0.03 0.02 0.03 
 
[-0.07 - 0.1] [-0.1 - 0.1] [-0.06- 0.1] 
Child's orphanhood status 0.001 0.0002 -0.001 
 
[-0.001 - 0.003] [-0.001 - 0.001] [-0.002 - 0.001] 
Type of guardian -0.01 0.17* -0.01 
 
[-0.07 - 0.04] [0.01 - 0.3] [-0.08 - 0.05] 
Guardian's gender 0.13* 0.17* 0.15* 
 
[0.02 - 0.2] [0.03 - 0.3] [0.04 - 0.3] 
Guardian's employment status 0.02 0.03 0.23 
 
[-0.01 - 0.05] [-0.02 - 0.1] [-0.01 - 0.5] 
Child's experience with saving. Do you have 
money saved (reported by child)? (%, YES, 
baseline value) 
-0.05 -0.03 -0.04 
 
[-0.2 - 0.1] [-0.2 - 0.1] [-0.2 - 0.1] 
Guardian's experience with saving. Do you 
have money saved (reported by guardian)? (%, 
YES, baseline value) 
0.06 0.08 0.1 
 
[-0.1 - 0.2] [-0.09 - 0.3] [-0.1 - 0.3] 
Financial Institution where CDA was 
opened: Centenary Bank -0.08* -0.04 -0.05 
 
[-0.1 - -0.02] [-0.12 - 0.03] [-0.1 - 0.01] 
Financial Institution where CDA was 
opened: DFCU -0.15* -0.115 -0.12 
 
[-0.3 - -0.04] [-0.3 - 0.05] [-0.3 - 0.01] 
Constant 0.3** 0.2* 0.04 
 
[0.2 - 0.4] [0.02 - 0.4] [-0.9 - 0.9] 
 
  
  
Observations 116 116 116 
R-squared 0.279 0.187 0.296 
*p≤0.05, **p≤0.01, ***p≤0.001 
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